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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The current US grand strategy of defeating, dismantling and disrupting Al-Qaeda and other violent transnational extremists, currently the focus in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has evolved into a COIN and stability strategy prosecuted at a level and spectrum unprecedented in US history. In many ways we have committed to a national COIN and stability strategy. Supporting a successful COIN campaign within a stability context requires a whole of government approach on a scale unparalleled in our nation's history. Despite some positive approaches, there has been no concerted effort from a national policy level to harness and direct the full effects of all instruments of national power. We have taken a mostly singular Military approach when the true answer lies in applying Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) elements in an integrated and unified effort. Concomitantly there are several policy changes required to integrate the instruments of national power along with definitive actions to harness those actions into a unified whole of government approach.
Pakistan, has evolved into a COIN and stability strategy prosecuted at a level and spectrum unprecedented in US history. In many ways we have committed to a national COIN and stability strategy. Supporting a successful COIN campaign within a stability context requires a whole of government approach on a scale unparalleled in our nation's history. Despite some positive approaches, there has been no concerted effort from a national policy level to harness and direct the full effects of all instruments of national power. We have taken a mostly singular Military approach when the true answer lies in applying Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial,
Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) elements in an integrated and unified effort. Concomitantly there are several policy changes required to integrate the instruments of national power along with definitive actions to harness those actions into a unified whole of government approach.
A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCIES
My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power . . . and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.
-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 1 The re-emergence of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory has served as a catalyst for significant change in US military doctrine in this decade and has improved operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in a similarly significant manner. It has served as a useful and healthy debate within both the US Government and the US Military on a wide variety of subjects ranging from force structure to training. More importantly, until the US came to grips with the necessity for a population centric COIN strategy in Iraq in early 2007, we were in grave danger of suffering a major strategic defeat. While much work needs to be accomplished in Iraq, it has been stabilized enough, through an intense COIN effort, to focus on Afghanistan and future threats. The President succinctly described the complex challenges that we face; mainly, a host of inherent asymmetries in our current conflict against today's adversaries. 6 Foremost is our conventional military superiority, especially when it is applied in a unilateral approach. Too often, we inadvertently force our adversaries to avoid our strength and migrate towards unconventional approaches in an attempt to balance this conventional superiority and the physical odds stacked against them. 7 Thus, the primacy we enjoy in a conventional manner is often offset by our adversaries, especially in a COIN environment. Future adversaries will observe this trend and likely respond with asymmetric or irregular methods involving concealment amongst the population. 8 This unintentional asymmetry, caused by military centric actions or other incomplete responses, causes our adversaries to move to a different "ground" that offers them sanctuary and offsets our perceived strengths. 9 Given this tendency and absent a full spectrum, whole of government approach, our adversaries undoubtedly choose the social and political fabric of the state as their battleground.
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Central to this problem is the population, more often than not caught somewhere in the middle. The population is critical to insurgents, transnational terrorists and violent 12 The ends of US strategy therefore are not necessarily winning or defeating these insurgencies or even gaining control of the state in question. As
President Obama stated with regards to Afghanistan, "…America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country." 13 The nature of protracted struggles amongst the people does not lend itself to decisive military victory. 14 Rather, US end(s) are containing regional destabilization, maintaining access to markets and resources, reducing transnational crime and more importantly allowing host governments the time, space and security to regain ungoverned or under governed space that allows the US and/or partner nations to more effectively isolate and destroy insurgents and violent transnational non-state actors and specifically prosecute a grand strategy against al Qaeda. 15 The US path to victory rests on managing threats and a dichotomy comprised of building host nation forces and capacity for governance enabled by the tacit or explicit acceptance of the population. 16 Challenges to the COIN Practitioner-The Dangers of the Military "Going it Alone"
For better or worse, the US military is the most preeminent and viable instrument of national power and is likely to be called on first in most contingencies, particularly those that involve major violence or exceed the capacity of US government agencies or foreign partners. 17 While the military role in COIN is essential for providing security and is clearly a critical requirement, it will not defeat an insurgency on its own. 18 In a counterinsurgency, the military is, in a sense, an enabling system for civil administration. 19 Utilizing a clear, hold and build methodology, 20 the military can set the required conditions for restoration of the basic necessities required for acceptance of a legitimate government by the population: security followed by essential services, rule of law and effective governance using US or indigenous force (likely trained by US military forces). 21 This can be accomplished through moderate levels of civil-military integration led by US or host nation military forces and augmented with a modest infusion of well planned civil works projects funded primarily with military funds.
However, without an aggressive follow up by civilian agencies more adept at understanding, harnessing, and synchronizing disparate entities such as non governmental agencies, host nation non-military elements and inter-governmental agencies, 22 actions undertaken by the military alone will have, at best, short term effects. Concomitantly, the military must undergo a significant cultural shift towards accepting interagency, inter-governmental, and non-governmental assistance and integration. In the words of Andrew Krepinevich, noted historian, author and former US Army officer:
Counterinsurgency requires a unity of effort and command among the military, political, economic and social dimensions of the conflict. Reconstruction efforts in the absence of security will almost certainly fail, as will attempts at political reform. 23 In order for the host nation to work safely with and within its population, achieve long term economic revival, garner political reconciliation, effect non-governmental assistance and ultimately insert the government between the insurgency and the population, civil and military measures must be applied nearly simultaneously. As FM 3-24 states:
Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.
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The failure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq offers the most striking example for uncoordinated actions and the uneven application of instruments of US national power. The CPA was grossly understaffed and disconnected from the military efforts. Tom Ricks summarizes this situation rather well in Fiasco:
The CPA was ineptly organized and frequently incompetent, working badly not only with Iraqis and the media, but even with the US military, its partner in the occupation. 25 Unfortunately this fundamental disconnect of US strategic ends in Iraq, plagued US efforts for nearly four years.
Despite the ineptness of the CPA in Iraq, there were some early signs of interagency coordination and an attempt at applying more instruments of national Enhance our nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies. The Core Mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy. This effort, while a positive initial initiative, represents but one agency and a "pickup game" of other agencies -lacking the authority and expertise needed to coordinate across the interagency. 38 These are but a few of the examples of the disparate efforts across the interagency to affect stability and reconstruction efforts in support of our grand strategy.
Serious challenges across the whole of government involving planning, budgeting, synchronization and coordination result from this dispersion of activities. In order to truly implement a national strategy in support of stability operations in general, and specifically COIN, the US needs a comprehensive and centralized policy.
This policy must link resources and authorities, while providing sufficient guidance from the President in support of vital US interests and US grand strategy.
When DOD efforts are included, the problem becomes one of an order of magnitude exceeding billions of dollars, but more importantly one that is disconnected from the priorities of the President and the grand strategy of the US.
Efforts dispersed across a wide swath of disconnected agencies, within regions and countries that may not best serve the vital interests of the US or our current grand strategy are at the least a waste of valuable resources and at worst counterproductive in support of that grand strategy.
Identifying the Key Elements for a Whole of Government Approach
While the S/CRS has been able to garner support from several agencies within the US government, the disconnected activities outlined previously are a significant impediment to implementing a true whole of government approach. In order to better harness all of our instruments of national power in support of national interests, executed as COIN and stability strategies, the US needs to re-examine its application of instruments national power.
Traditionally, when we look at applying instruments of national power to a strategy and concomitant policy, we start with a continuum consisting of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) elements. Uniting the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success and resident across this continuum requires a collaborative and cooperative policy focused on a common goal. 41 Whereas military operations require unity of command, the challenge for the policy maker is in achieving unity of effort, manifested as a whole of government unified of action.
42
In this case, we have addressed the Military aspect in great detail -clearly the military has a significant role in providing security, and initially enabling a comprehensive, whole of government approach. We have also addressed how the military cannot do this in isolation. This is the classic military simile of "if the only tool you have is a hammer, every solution looks like a nail." The challenges of synchronizing and coordinating a whole of government unified action plan demands more than a hammer to pound the nail of violent, transnational extremists and certainly more than a hammer in complex operations involving COIN and stability. This has been addressed within NSPD-44, the diplomatic effort resident in the S/CRS, expanded capacity in USAID and other initiatives across the interagency. While not perfect, this has been the best attempt at a US whole of government, unity of effort, approach to date.
Going forward we need to recognize that there are more players within the interagency that are involved in stability, COIN and reconstruction. We need to expand our traditional horizon beyond DIME -especially DOD and DOS to include more agencies that bring additional instruments of national power to bear. More importantly, we need to recognize the limitations inherent in a policy that places a lead agency in charge of national policy -in this case S/CRS.
Current Policy Disconnects
Current US policy and strategy has drawn an unnecessary and dysfunctional differentiation between the concepts of COIN and the tasks of stability operations. As we have seen, there is substantial overlap between COIN and stability -especially when those operations have strategic implications. Additionally, there is much debate within the interagency as to the definitions of both COIN and Stability. In order to develop a comprehensive, whole of government policy -within the context of the strategic environment outlined previously, a grouping of strategic realities of concern to policy is offered; not by definitions, but by the attributes they share in an attempt to highlight the challenges faced when crafting policy. Towards that end, David Ucko has identified three specific attributes of key import that stability and COIN operations share: -A medium to high level of hostile activity targeting the "stabilizing" forces, whether foreign or local; this is also known as a nonpermissive operational environment.
-An underlying state-building initiative, of which the military stabilization effort is but a subset. State-building is loosely understood as primarily nonmilitary assistance in the creation or reinforcement of state structures, culminating in the formation of a government that is, at the very least, able to maintain stability in the territory under its jurisdiction.
-The deployment of ground troops to conduct operations in the midst of a local population. 43 It is when the three of these characteristics have coexisted within our policy that the US has struggled to achieve our desired ends. 44 Pertaining to our current policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK), it also has implications for any future strategy which must be addressed to secure vital US interests. While there may be an important tactical and operational distinction between stability operations in Pakistan and COIN efforts in Afghanistan, this has created a false strategic dichotomy; both are but a part of the broader grand strategy. Because of the major conditional differences, based on the unique attributes extant in each country, we have developed a strategy and policies that address each separately. We have also fallen into a definitional trap, trying to separate stability and COIN within an AFPAK construct that confines our thinking and drives our policy formulation and execution into discreet stove pipes based on these definitions. Although the terms COIN and stability are not entirely interchangeable, as we have seen, both comprise simultaneous military, informational, diplomatic and economic efforts to assist a government to stabilize and consolidate in its own territory -in this case AFPAK. Instead of addressing the stability attributes inherent in Pakistan and the COIN attributes in Afghanistan within one policy,
we have tried to fit the issues in Pakistan in one "box" and the issues in Afghanistan into another -each with their own policy. In reality, they both coexist as equals in our policy and must be treated the same in terms of interagency response, resourcing and prioritization.
This is the fundamental problem with our current policy, as manifested in NSPD 44. NSPD 44 addresses only stability and reconstruction, while ignoring security and COIN. It charges the Department of State with oversight for stability but allocates no additional resources or authority. More importantly, it neglects the attributes of both stability and COIN as outlined above and is not nested within our current AFPAK strategy. In fact, the processes prescribed within NSPD 44 have not been used to craft current Afghanistan or Pakistan policy. The net result is a strategic disconnect within our policy that relies heavily on military efforts at the expense of other instruments of national power.
In order to succeed in the complex operating environment of today and address the requirement to integrate many disparate instruments of our national power, the US needs a national policy that recognizes this reality. The US needs to create a national security structure process that empowers, resources and harnesses all instruments of national power ensuring a synchronized application of ways and means towards the desired end(s) in stability and COIN operations. Designed for near term ends in AFPAK, this construct can be applied for the duration of our grand strategy against global, transnational, violent extremists and overseas contingencies.
The United States has a significant stake in pursuing stability in Pakistan, This IPC will allow temporary inclusion of other agencies not included in the baseline staff, based on specific contingencies, as well as provide the required equity necessary in interagency relationships.
The PPD must provide enough staffing to support three simultaneous planning efforts -accounting for two concurrent operations (in this case, Iraq and AFPAK) and some capacity for future planning. 48 Under this new policy, OMB should be required to adjust and augment departmental budgets to account for interagency support for this staff. This is an important requirement as it allows the interagency to support new staffing requirements without a decrement to agency budgets or personnel allocations.
This "supra staff" would be charged with developing policy and strategic guidance to the interagency and empowered with budgetary authority resident in the OMB staff, directed by the President and appropriated by Congress. This new staff, within the NSS, should operate within the authorities outlined in Presidential Policy Directive-1(PPD-1) 49 to ensure coordination and collaboration across the interagency, but empowered to operate outside of PPD-1 in exigent circumstances. Because this staff would receive direct guidance from and report to the President, it would provide rapid strategic and policy options while allowing the National Security Advisor to maintain his role as an "honest broker" in the overall policy advice to the President, as well as maintain the integrity of the NSS. 50 Much of the catalyst for change can start with a revamped National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy, prepared by the National Security Staff, is usually a lightly edited statement of broad generalities -and in many cases is a series of "wish lists" for disparate agencies.
This option offers not only a large degree of top-down, directive authority, but also access to diverse expertise within a staff comprised of groups with representation from all the relevant departments and agencies concerned with stability, COIN or other contingencies present within our grand strategy. It seamlessly addresses the complex issues in both Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as future contingencies by consolidating policy, strategy and resources at the executive level. 51 The White House should oversee a mandatory quadrennial national security review, which would go beyond the current NSS to identify key A NSS that lays out the President's vision for embarking on a whole of government approach in support of a national strategy implementing COIN or stability, imbedded with the changes outline above might provide the top down impetus needed to effect a change. Additionally, Adams and Williams propose another aspect that may provide an added element -resourcing:
national security priorities. That review should be conducted jointly by OMB and the NSS, with agency participation, parallel to the defense and foreign policy reviews….A classified National Security Guidance should grow out of that review, and be conducted every two years. The guidance should provide a detailed roadmap to agencies, including budgetary guidance, focusing on key national security priorities. 52 This could be a powerful mechanism. When coupled with budget submission, testimony and interaction with Congress, NSS focus and oversight, agency responsiveness it will empower strategic leaders of agencies and departments across the government. It provides the right message from the President with the appropriate budgetary influence.
The key priorities yield much needed clarity across all agencies and departments throughout the government. The National Security Guidance implements a singular direction for all agencies and departments to pursue in support of the key priorities. It incorporates more than just DOS and DOD -it empowers the Assistant to the President for Security, Stability and COIN and his staff, as well as all supporting agencies, especially those with capability and capacity within a DIMEFIL continuum. Those agencies could craft similar strategies that are not only embedded with the NSS, but properly resourced and structured.
Lastly, the structure created by the State Department under the S/CRS must be expanded and continued. The President has called for a civilian surge in Afghanistan "that reinforces positive action." 53 The current organization of S/CRS consisting of 4,250 is clearly insufficient. A larger force of 10-15,000 is optimal for the US to mitigate current and potential crisis in fragile and failing states in support our grand strategy.
The costs of this force are large, but not insurmountable. 54 There is some risk in creating an additional bureaucratic structure in the midst of multiple overseas contingency operations, especially within Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Afghanistan is of particular concern given the narrowing window of opportunity for success. There is also danger in this staff becoming directive and not collaborative, despite the diversity envisioned in the staff make up. If it is too directive then the level of support from the participating departments and agencies will be less than desired.
These risks are minimal and mitigated by the executive authority inherent in the structure.
Congressional Reform
The President can ensure a whole of government approach when structuring the executive branch. Without Congressional support, however, he is limited by the real power of policy: money. National security budgets and appropriations to agencies and departments are the most accurate reflections of US security policy. 55 While Congress has played a critical role in national security and policy since 9/11, there is a strong need for congressional reform. The reforms outlined above will have minimal impact absent tangible changes in the way Congress appropriates and authorizes budgets. While Congress has taken an important first step in integrating nearly all of the appropriations functions for international affairs into one sub-committee, action is needed to strengthen the authorizing committees in both chambers and restoration of authorization bills for foreign policy institutions such as USAID. 56 Congress must undergo a similar reduction of stovepipes and centralization of authority similar to the executive branch initiatives listed earlier. Congress should also consider legislating requirements for national security planning and strategic guidance documents as outlined above. Finally the President should be required to transmit to Congress a single national security budget that outlines all stability and COIN requirements is support of our grand strategy. 57 
Conclusions
The dawn of a new decade will likely look much like the previous; a protracted series of conflicts against a global insurgency in a complex environment. Within this complex environment, the US will base a significant portion of its strategy within a COIN or stability environment. In order to be successful, wholesale policy changes are needed in order to employ all of our instruments of national power in a whole of government approach. This will only happen if we implement major policy changes to create the structures and processes necessary to succeed.
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